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ABSTRACT
Objective. To explore the influences of discrete positive and negative emotions on
cooperation in the context of a social dilemma game.
Design. Two controlled studies were undertaken. In Study 1, 69 participants were
randomly assigned to an essay emotion manipulation task designed to induce either
guilt, joy or no strong emotion. In Study 2, 95 participants were randomly assigned
to one of the same three tasks, and the impact of emotional condition on cooperation
was explored using a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
Results. Study 1 established that the manipulation task was successful in inducing the
specified emotions. The analysis from Study 2 revealed no significant main effects for
emotions, in contrast to previous research. However, there was a significant effect for
participants’ pre-existing tendency to cooperate (social value orientation; SVO).
Conclusion. Methodological explanations for the result are explored, including
the possible impact of trial-and-error strategies, different cooperation games and
endogenous vs exogenous emotions.
Subjects Psychiatry and Psychology, Public Health
Keywords Well-being, Positive and negative emotions, Cooperation, Social dilemma games
THE INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONS ON COOPERATION
The tendency to cooperate (or not) has often been understood as a dispositional trait
varying between individuals (Messick & McClintock, 1968). For example, social value
orientation (SVO), defined as individual preferences for specific distributions of outcomes
between oneself and another (McClintock, 1972), significantly predicts cooperation in
social dilemmas (Balliet, Parks & Joireman, 2009).
However, it has more recently been suggested that emotions experienced immediately
prior to a cooperative activity may have an impact on the extent of resulting cooperation.
Hertel et al. (2000) examined the intuitive assumption that positive emotions increase
cooperation. Although they did not find direct evidence to support this hypothesis,
they identified that positive and negative emotions, in general, affected decision-making
processes, which are known indirectly to affect cooperation depending on the situation.
Specifically, participants induced with positive emotions tended to follow specified social
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norms to a greater extent. However, the study did not consider qualitative differences
between discrete emotions, nor individual differences in SVO.
Subsequent studies accounting for these factors have illustrated varied impacts of
emotions on cooperation. Ketelaar & Au (2003) measured cooperation in a well-known
social dilemma, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). In a two person PDG players have
two choices, to cooperate or to defect, with the outcome contingent on the combination
of behaviours from each player. What defines the game as a PDG are the relative values of
these four possible outcomes (Kollock, 1998). These are calibrated such that the highest
outcome for an individual player is produced in instances where s/he defects (i.e., does not
cooperate) whilst the other cooperates. The next highest outcome is when both cooperate,
followed by when both defect. The lowest outcome is the reverse of the highest, such that
the individual cooperates whilst the other player defects. Depending on the scenario in
which the PDG is framed, the calibration may be set such that mutual cooperation yields
the highest combined outcome of all four combinations. The fundamental “dilemma” of
the game, however, is always the same: that the rational strategy for both individuals is to
defect, but that this leads to a sub-optimal outcome compared with the situation had they
both cooperated.
In order to account for SVO, participants in Ketelaar and Au’s (2003) study undertook
40 repeated rounds of a PDG, which established their tendencies to cooperate or defect.
Subsequently, one group of participants was given an emotion induction task in which they
wrote about a personal event associated with guilt, whilst the others described a normal day
as neutrally as possible. Afterwards, participants engaged in another 40 rounds of the PDG
in order to assess any influence of the induced emotion. Results suggested that those partic-
ipants who initially behaved uncooperatively (i.e., exhibiting a “proself” SVO) cooperated
to a greater extent subsequent to writing about guilt compared with those writing about
a neutral experience. Importantly, this pattern was not seen in those participants who
initially behaved relatively cooperatively (i.e., a “prosocial” SVO). However, the apparent
impact of guilt was only seen in the first 10 rounds of the game subsequent to the writing
task. Meanwhile, influences of the SVO were seen throughout all 40 rounds.
The same pattern has been replicated in subsequent studies investigating additional
discrete emotions. de Hooge, Zeelenberg & Breugelmans (2007) employed a similar emotion
manipulation task, with the addition of a shame condition. Cooperation was assessed by
means of a give-some dilemma game (GSDG). Participants were paired and given 10 coins
(each worth e0.50); however, they had the option of giving their partner some of their
coins in order to double their value. Thus, the level of cooperation was measured in terms
of how many coins each participant gives away, in just one interaction. SVO was assessed
using the Triple-Dominance measure (VanLange et al., 1997). The results supported
Ketelaar and Au’s (2003) finding regarding the impact of guilt on cooperation; however,
there was no significant effect in terms of shame. Employing a similar methodology,
Nelissen, Dijker & deVries (2007) compared guilt and fear. Induced guilt increased
cooperation in those classified as proself, whereas induced fear reduced cooperation in
those classified as prosocial. As well as adding to the evidence for an impact of guilt on
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cooperation, this study also illustrates the importance of specific qualitative differences
between discrete emotions.
Positive emotions and cooperation within the broaden-and-build
theory
To date, discrete emotions considered positive have not been investigated using these
kinds of methodologies. Positive emotions have recently been the subject of considerable
attention within psychology, with Fredrickson (1998) arguing that positive emotions
have a functional utility beyond merely feeling pleasant such as facilitating and building
social connections and relationships. That is, within Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build
theory, negative emotions are seen to narrow an individual’s range of responses in terms
of thoughts and actions. This, in turn, focuses resources on self-protective, “fight” and
“flight” behaviours. Positive emotions, meanwhile, are seen to broaden an individual’s
range of thoughts and actions. Fredrickson (2001) holds that this temporary broadening
facilitates and promotes opportunities for an individual to both discover and further
develop enduring personal resources, as well as building future social relationships.
Moreover, she argues that this can generate upward spirals of positive emotions, cognitions
and actions, allowing for personal development and transformation. Instinctively, this is
an attractive theory that provides explicit predictions, some of which have been supported
by experimental evidence (see, e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). This will be further
discussed below in relation to the discrete emotion joy.
Interpersonal aspects of guilt and joy
In the research described above, guilt is commonly defined as a moral emotion,
experienced subsequent to a moral transgression. Tangney, Stuewig &Mashek (2007) argue
that guilt is a “self-conscious emotion that is evoked by self-reflection and self-evaluation”
(p. 347), and subsequently has the potential to promote constructive and proactive
pursuits, often towards others. Evidence for the role of guilt in interpersonal relationships
comes from an experiment involving functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
scans. Takahashi et al. (2004) found greater brain activity in the areas associated with
theory of mind (ToM) and social cognition in participants who read sentences associated
with guilt compared with those reading more neutral sentences.
The impact of positive emotions on interpersonal relationships is less clear. Often
considered one of the most basic positive emotions (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987),
joy is perhaps the archetypal positive emotion and plays a central role in Fredrickson’s
broaden-and-build theory. Johnson & Fredrickson (2005) found that joy reduced own-race
bias, hypothesizing that the experience of joy may have the effect of increasing a sense
of common in-group identity. However, joy has also been defined as a “self-directed or
noninterpersonal” emotion derived from pleasure-related experiences (Berenbaum, 2002).
Accordingly, Takahashi et al. (2008) compared participants reading sentences associated
with joy, pride or a more neutral situation in a fMRI study. They found that pride elicited
greater activation in areas associated with ToM (as with guilt), compared with joy and
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more neutral sentences. Joy, on the other hand, illustrated greater activation in areas
linked with the “processing of hedonic or appetitive stimuli” (p. 898) rather than areas
associated with interpersonal social stimuli. This would seem to challenge the idea of joy
as promoting social cooperation. However, considering the study by Hertel et al. (2000)
in which general positive affect facilitated decision making consistent with social norms,
it could be hypothesized that joy will not influence cooperation per se, but rather affects
cooperation indirectly by increasing self-absorbed/self-directed embracing of social norms
(or values).
Hypotheses
The aim of the present research was to build upon previous findings on the influences of
discrete emotions on cooperation within the context of a social dilemma. Specifically, it
aimed to compare the differential influence of joy and guilt on participants’ inclinations to
cooperate in a PDG.
Based on the foregoing arguments it was hypothesized that results from previous
studies on guilt and cooperation would be replicated. With respect to joy, our study was
exploratory since, as discussed above, the likely direction of impact of joy on cooperation
was not clear from existing theory and research.
We report two studies. Study 1 was a validation conducted in order to establish whether
an adapted version of the essay manipulation task (e.g., Ketelaar & Au, 2003) was able to
reliably induce the discrete emotions of guilt and joy. Study 2 reports results from a study
comparing the impact of evoked joy and guilt on subsequent performance in a PDG.
STUDY 1
Methodology
Participants
Sixty-nine people took part in the study. All were students at the University of East London
and ranged between 18 and 51 years of age (mean 22.62). 22 were male and 47 female. In
return for participation they were offered an opportunity to enter a prize draw to win a £25
voucher. Both studies reported within this article were approved by the University of East
London’s Review Board.
Intervention
The emotion manipulation essay questions were adapted from several previous research
studies. Participants were required to write for approximately 10 min about a specific event
in their life in as much detail as possible. The control and guilt conditions were adapted
from studies carried out by Ketelaar & Au (2003), de Hooge, Zeelenberg & Breugelmans
(2007), and Nelissen, Dijker & deVries (2007). In the control condition participants were
asked to write about their “regular activities and schedule”, describing events neutrally. In
the guilt condition participants were asked to write about an experience that had caused
them to feel “regretful and remorseful”, focusing on what made them feel particularly
guilty, e.g., cheating or forgetting a friend’s birthday.
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Since no previous study had used this methodology to induce joy, sentences were
adapted from those used in the fMRI experiment by Takahashi et al. (2008). Hence,
participants were asked to write about a personal experience in which they felt “joyful
and delighted”, focusing on what made them feel significant pleasure, e.g., receiving a
valuable gift or having a delicious dinner.
Measures
Participants’ emotional state post writing was assessed using two instruments: PANAS-X,
and the State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS).
The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a 60-item schedule assessing feelings and
emotions experienced at the present moment. Responses are recorded along a rating
scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Subscales representing
specific emotions can be calculated from scores on the PANAS-X. In the present study,
the dimension “Joviality” (including 8 items such as “happy” and “joyful”) and “Guilt”
(6 items including “guilty” and “blameworthy”) were used as dependent measures.
The State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS; Marschall, Sanftner & Tangney, 1994) is a
15-item questionnaire developed to measure and distinguish between shame, guilt and
pride in the present, based on phenomenological descriptions. Responses are recorded
along a Likert type scale ranging from 1 (“Not feeling this way at all”) to 5 (“Feeling this
way very strongly”).
In addition, a manipulation check was implemented to enable analysis of the nature of
events recalled. This was operationalized using an adapted version of an Essay Evaluation
Measure (EEM; Dickerson et al., 2004). This manipulation control questionnaire assesses
participants’ own perceptions of the written essay, asking them to judge the extent to which
it is personal, emotional and meaningful on a 7-point scale (from “not at all” to “a great
deal”). An additional, condition-specific question was added requiring participants to
identify how accurate they consider their descriptions (in the control condition), how
much they blamed themselves (in the guilt condition), and how much they enjoyed the
experience (in the joy condition) at the time that it occurred.
Procedure
Students were approached after lectures, and asked to participate in a short psychology
study that involved anonymously writing about a previously experienced event and
answering a few questionnaires. Upon showing interest, participants were escorted to a
quiet area where they read and completed a consent form.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. All necessary
materials were provided at the start of the experiment and they were asked to complete
the tasks in the following order: (1) the manipulation task; (2) PANAS-X; (3) SSGS; (4)
EEM. Having completed the task and the questionnaires, each participant was debriefed.
Results
Prior to the main analysis, data from the EEM were reviewed. A between-group ANOVA
found a statistically significant effect of emotion manipulation condition (F[2,70] =
14.96,p< 0.005). Post-hoc tests showed that participants in the guilt condition rated their
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics indicating the mean, standard deviation and frequency of missing
values for each condition (N = number of participants), and for the dependent variables (DV).
Condition DV
PANAS-X Guilt PANAS-X Joy SSGS Guilt SSGS Shame
Guilt
(N = 23)
16.47 (±6.49)
2
21.22 (±9.41)
3
12.78 (±6.35)
0
9.83 (±3.90)
0
Control
(N = 23)
10.99 (±5.68)
1
24.00 (±7.59)
1
10.52 (±5.20)
0
8.22 (±3.20)
1
Joy
(N = 23)
8.90 (±4.83)
2
29.17 (±7.73)
1
7.74 (±3.82)
0
6.35 (±2.31)
0
essays significantly higher on the EEM (i.e., more personal, meaningful and emotional)
compared with participants in both the joy and control conditions. However, participants
in the joy condition also rated their essays significantly higher on the EEM than those in the
control condition.
Descriptive statistics for data on self-reported emotional state are given in Table 1. A
MANOVA was conducted with emotion manipulation condition (guilt, joy or neutral) as
a between-group variable and the PANAS-X Guilt, PANAS-X Joy, SSGS Guilt and SSGS
Shame as dependent variables. In terms of missing values, the mean value of the existing
data in the relevant dimensions for the specific participant, was subsequently added to the
missing fields.
There was a significant main effect of emotion condition at the p < 0.05 level across
the combined dependent variables (F[8,128] = 3.8) and for each of variables individually
(PANAS-X Guilt F[2,66] = 10.8; PANAS-X Joy F[2,66] = 5.46; SSGS Guilt F[2,66] = 5.38;
SSGS Shame F[2,66] = 6.78).
For the PANAS-X Guilt variable, post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD) indicated that participants
in the guilt condition reported significantly higher guilt compared with both control and
joy conditions (p< 0.05). Participants in the joy condition did not differ significantly from
those in the control condition.
For the PANAS-X Joy variable, participants in the joy condition reported significantly
more joy compared with participants in the guilt condition. The difference between
participants in the joy and control conditions was not significant at the p < 0.05
level. However, it was in the expected direction and was approaching significance
(p = 0.094); subsequent analysis revealed that it would have attained significance with
a less conservative test (i.e., LSD instead of Tukey). Participants in the guilt condition did
not differ significantly from those in the control condition.
On both the SSGS Guilt and SSGS Shame, participants in the guilt condition reported
significantly higher levels of both guilt and shame at the p < 0.05 level, compared
with participants in the joy condition. However, they did not differ significantly with
participants in the control condition.
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Discussion
Those participants writing about guilt or joy evaluated their essays as significantly higher
on the EEM compared with those writing about a more neutral event. In terms of content,
participants in the guilt condition tended to write about experiences in which they, for
example, had cheated on a test or a partner, or let down a close friend. Participants in the
joy condition, by contrast, wrote about experiences such as receiving an expensive present
or winning something. In the neutral condition most participants wrote about normal,
everyday activities. Generally, then, we can be confident in participants’ compliance with
the manipulation task.
In terms of participants’ subsequent emotional state, scores on the two dimensions
of guilt and joy within PANAS-X clearly indicate that the emotion manipulation task
influenced participants. As hypothesized, the guilt condition elevated scores on the
PANAS-X Guilt scale relative to both the control and the joy conditions. Similarly,
participants in the joy condition reported significantly more salient experiences on the joy
dimension compared with those participants in the guilt condition. Although this group
did not differ significantly from the control condition at the p < 0.05 level, nevertheless
there was evidence that the intervention was working as expected in terms of significantly
discriminating between the main conditions guilt and joy; albeit perhaps not as strongly as
the guilt intervention.
In addition to the PANAS-X, the SSGS measure indicated that participants in the guilt
condition reported both significantly more guilt and shame as compared with the joy
condition but not the control condition. This suggests that both emotions were present
within the guilt condition. It is worth noticing that the lack of difference between the guilt
and control condition might be because the joy condition involved decreasing reports
or the control condition involved increasing reports of guilt and shame; and that this
might illustrate that a control condition should not be considered as totally neutral. (As
an interesting aside, this result suggests that contra the studies of de Hooge and colleagues
(2007; 2008) it may in fact be difficult to induce guilt in isolation from shame.)
Overall, the results of Study 1 supported use of modified emotion manipulation essay
as an intervention to induce positive feelings of joy as well as guilt. However, given the
apparent difference in “strength” between the two induction tasks, it was decided to modify
the writing tasks slightly for use in Study 2 by adding a sentence to the instructions for both
the guilt and joy conditions:
“Try to at least write 10 lines. If you find it hard to remember the details of the event, try
to imagine yourself in the situation again”.
The intention was that this would further increase participants’ vividness of recollection
and absorption in the task, thereby increasing the strength of emotional induction.
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STUDY 2
Methodology
Participants
As in Study 1, participants were students at the University of East London and recruited in
the same manner. However, as a further incentive to participate and to encourage serious
engagement in the study, participants were given the opportunity to enter a prize draw to
win a £50 voucher. One participant withdrew from the experiment due to other commit-
ments and one participant was excluded for failing to correctly complete one of the ques-
tionnaires. The final sample consisted of 95 participants (41 males and 54 females). Partic-
ipants were between the ages of 18 and 50 years with a mean age of 24.16 years (SD±5.19).
Interventions
The same manipulation task was used as in Study 1, but with the small modification to the
instructions described above.
Measures
SVO was assessed with the Triple-Dominance measure (TDM; VanLange et al., 1997). The
TDM involves nine items, each consisting of different distributions of “valuable points”
between oneself and a hypothetical unknown other. Each item covers three different
distributions, which are normally categorized into two groups: prosocial (equal division)
and proself (individualistic and competitive divisions). Participants can be classified as
either prosocial or proself according to whether six or more consistent answers fall within
one of the two specified categories.
The main dependent variable was frequency of cooperative interactions in 10 rounds
of a Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG). This was facilitated using a specifically developed
computer program in which participants engaged in an adapted version of the PDG. The
program was developed to mimic a real world interaction between two participants, such
that participants believed they were interacting with another person at a different location
(see Procedure, below, for more details). Participants could opt to either cooperate or
defect whilst the computer program was set to respond according to the “Tit-for-Tat”
strategy (in which the initial response involves cooperation and in subsequent rounds
matches the participant’s previous mode of response). The scenario for the PDG was
described in terms of varying quantities of lottery tickets. The pay-offmatrix (see Table 2)
corresponded to standard PDGs (Kollock, 1998). After the PDG had been completed,
emotional state was measured using the joy and guilt subscales of the PANAS-X. The EEM
was again used to enable a manipulation check.
Procedure
Participants were told that the experiment involved writing about a previous life event,
followed by a computer based interaction with another person and the completion of
several questionnaires.
After participants had given consent, the experimenter excused himself, informing
them that he had to contact a colleague in another campus in order for them to start the
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Table 2 Pay-offmatrix applied within the current Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
Person 2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2,2 0,3
Person 1
Defect 3,0 1,1
experiment simultaneously. This deceit was intended to further facilitate a perceived sense
of interaction during the computer-based experiment. The experimenter made certain to
“contact his colleague” using a mobile telephone, in full view of the participants.
Participants were then seated in front of a computer and told that they could potentially
increase their chances of winning a £50 voucher depending on the results of their inter-
action. The first part of the experiment was computer based and involved describing and
demonstrating the PDG task in order to familiarise participants. Rules of the interaction
were thoroughly explained, and participants were required to answer hypothetical
questions about each of the four possible cooperation/defect scenarios. Crucially, they
were asked to judge the quantitative distributions between each hypothetical individual,
for each scenario presented on the screen. They could not proceed until answering all of
the questions correctly. The instructions and rules were written so as to be value neutral,
hence rather than using words such as cooperation and defect, participants chose either
“Option A” or “Option B”. This was followed by a 10 min countdown in which participants
were instructed to complete the demographic questions and the emotion manipulation
task. The interaction task began subsequently. Once the participant selected “Option
A” or “Option B”, there was a delay, randomly ranging from 7 to 15 s, followed by the
response of “the other person”. This was always followed by on-screen feedback stating
how many tickets each “player” had received. After 10 rounds of the game, the final screen
requested the participant to complete the remaining questionnaires in the following order:
PANAS-X, EEM and the TDM questionnaire (note that this was administered last so as to
avoid influencing behaviour on the PDG through any kind of priming mechanism).
After completing the questionnaires, participants were debriefed. As in Study 1,
participants were briefly informed of the requirements of the study prior to participation
and asked to give consent. However, this experiment involved deceiving participants both
in terms of the description of the interaction game and the experimenter’s staged “phone
call”. The true nature of the study was disclosed sensitively to the participants during the
debriefing session; a written debriefing was also provided.
Results
The frequency of cooperative responses was calculated as the linear sum of responses from
all 10 rounds of the PDG. Analysis was then undertaken in two stages. Firstly, as in Study 1,
data were checked in terms of compliance within the emotion manipulation task. Secondly,
there was an investigation of cooperation wherein an ANCOVA was applied to investigate
cooperation in all 10 rounds.
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Initial control analyses – EEM
Participants’ self-reported retrospective accounts of the emotion manipulation task were
analysed as in Study 1. The condition specific items in the EEM indicated that participants
in the guilt condition reported their essays as involving self-blame at the time events
occurred (mean 5.2, SD ±1.6). Those in the control condition indicated that their
account was accurate (mean 5.3, SD ±1.2) and those in the joy condition reported that
their essays involved enjoyment (mean 6.0, SD ±1.3). Moreover, combining the scores
from the three EEM questions and applying an ANOVA revealed a significant effect for
emotion manipulation condition (F[2,108] = 21.51, p < 0.005). Post-hoc tests showed
that participants in the guilt (p< 0.005) and joy (p< 0.005) condition rated their essay as
more personal, meaningful and emotional compared with the control condition, but that
they were no different from one another in these respects.
Impact of emotional condition on cooperation
To assess the influence of the emotion condition on cooperation over the 10 rounds of
the PDG a one-way ANCOVA was calculated with total cooperation as the dependent
variable, emotional condition as the independent variable and SVO as a covariate. The
main effect of condition was not significant (F[2,91] = 0.366,p< 0.69); however, the effect
of the covariate was significant (F[1,91] = 9.65,p < 0.005). This suggests that any effect
on cooperation due to the emotion condition was small in comparison with the effect of
participants’ SVO.
This result was contrary to our hypothesis, based on previous research, that emotional
manipulation would have an effect on cooperation over and above SVO. To explore this
result further, we used scores on the TDM to assign each participant as prosocial or proself.
Out of a total of 95 participants, 41 were classified as prosocial and 37 as proself (17 could
not be categorised as either prosocial or proself and were thus excluded from this analyses).
Crossed with the three experimental conditions this yielded six groups of approximately
equal size (all withN between 11 and 15).
Figure 1 shows the mean percentages of cooperative responses for each group, plotted
against each of the 10 rounds. Visual inspection suggests a rather high fluctuation over
the first five rounds, but with a pattern beginning to emerge from round six onwards that
seems to be influenced by SVO.
To explore whether there was a significant “first round” effect, logistic regression was
used to estimate the likelihood of either cooperation or defection in the first round,
with emotion manipulation condition and SVO as independent variables. A total of 68
cases were analysed and resulted in the full model approaching significance in predicting
cooperation (omnibus chi-square= 10.87, df = 5, p = 0.054). The model accounted for
between 10.8% and 14.5% of the variance in terms of cooperation, with 46.3% of the
cooperative responses predicted, whilst 74.1% of the defective responses were predicted.
In total, 62.1% responses were predicted accurately. Table 3 contains coefficients and Wald
statistics as well as associated degrees of freedom and probability values for each of the
predicting variables and their interaction. This reveals that emotion condition, SVO and
their interaction predicted cooperation in the first round.
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Figure 1 Cooperation in % for each round of the PDG. Figure shows the mean percentages of cooper-
ative responses for each group, plotted against each of the 10 rounds. Visual inspection suggests a rather
high fluctuation over the first five rounds, but with a pattern beginning to emerge from round six onwards
that seems to be influenced by SVO.
Table 3 Values of the predicting variables extracted from a logistic regression analysis.
Predicting
variables
Coefficient Wald Degree of
freedom
Probability
value
Condition −2.23 5.78 1 .016
SVO −2.26 6.51 1 .011
Interaction - 7.73 2 .021
Discussion
As in Study 1, the EEM suggested that participants perceived that the content of their essays
met the requirements of the specified emotional conditions. Participants writing about
guilt or joy rated their essays as significantly more personal, meaningful and emotional as
compared with the control condition. In addition, participants in Study 2 spent the same
amount of time writing whilst also being subject to the enhanced instructions regarding
length and increased imagination. Further, informal review of the content of the essays
suggested that participants also tended to write about similar experiences as those in Study
1. In the joy condition, these involved detailed accounts of experiences such as engaging in
pleasurable activities, getting new things and winning prizes as well as travelling and being
with friends; compared with accounts of neglecting, disappoint and letting down friends,
family and partners as well as cheating in tests in the guilt condition. Considering these ob-
servations together with the evidence from Study 1, and also with the fact that several of the
studies discussed earlier have utilised the same induction task, it felt reasonable to assume
that participants adhered to the manipulation requirements. Thus, they could be con-
strued as experiencing the specified emotion at the time when they undertook the PDG.
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The main analysis suggested, contrary to our hypothesis, frequency of cooperation
was not influenced by the emotion manipulation condition. However, the significance of
the SVO as a covariate suggests that participants’ existing tendency towards cooperative
behaviour was outweighing any impact of the emotion induction. Our subsequent
exploratory analysis of progression through all 10 rounds sheds some additional light
on this. Regressing responses to the first interaction on emotional condition suggested
that condition tended to predict the likelihood of a cooperative response. However, we
would interpret this with caution, since it is evident from Fig. 1 that the first five rounds
were characterised by a wide range of mean responses, whilst the latter five interactions
appeared – at least from visual inspection of the data – to be more strongly influenced by
SVO. That SVO has a strong influence on cooperation is consistent with previous research
(Balliet, Parks & Joireman, 2009). However, it raises the question of the extent to which
momentary emotional states can achieve the same, at least in the long term. It seems, in
the present data at least, that the effect of emotion manipulation on cooperation dispersed
quickly, existing only within the first round, if at all.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current results support the notion that cognitive resources and strategies (opera-
tionalised as SVO) play an important role in cooperation; this is consistent with an
extensive recent meta-analysis (Balliet, Parks & Joireman, 2009). In terms of the overall
aim of the study, however, we are not able to draw clear inferences about the effect of
positive emotions on cooperation, since our results found no impact of either joy or guilt
on cooperation in a PDG. Evidently there are discrepancies between the results from the
current study and previous research. It is therefore worth exploring some of the possible
reasons why our results did not follow the same pattern even in relation to guilt.
Clearly, it is possible that some procedural flaw gave rise to the observed result whereby
there was no discernible impact on cooperation of emotional condition over and above
SVO. However, each aspect of the methodology – the emotion manipulation task, the
cooperation game, the measure of SVO and the procedural order – were drawn directly
from previous research. The experimental procedure was carefully piloted and tested.
Debriefing participants revealed that the element of deception (i.e., playing against a “real”
opponent in a different campus) had been successful, and no systematic problems were
identified.4
4 It may also be that previous results
overstate the real effect of emotion
on cooperation due to the impact of
publication bias and/or false positives.
This possibility that must be taken
seriously in light of recent discussions,
especially in social psychology (see,
e.g., Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn,
2011).
Assuming that our methodology “worked” as intended, and that findings from previous
studies are robust, what could explain the present result? Two possibilities, not mutually
exclusive, are that some aspect of the procedure rendered the effect of momentary emotion
on cooperation small in comparison with that of individuals’ existing predisposition
towards cooperation, and that aspects of the procedure in previous studies artificially
magnified what are in reality very small effects. What aspects of our procedure might be
culpable?
The apparent irregularities throughout rounds 1 to 5 might suggest that participants
did not take the game seriously, perhaps due to the low stakes involved. However, previous
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studies have identified effects in instances where stakes varied considerably, from lottery
tickets (Nelissen, Dijker & deVries, 2007), to expected pay-offs of $2 each (Ketelaar &
Au, 2003) to e20 each (de Hooge, Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2007). Moreover, our
interpretation of the pattern of response shown in Fig. 1 is that the initial irregularity
reduced markedly after five interactive rounds. If this is correct, it seems unlikely that
participants would initially choose an option carelessly but start taking the game more
seriously after a few rounds.
Perhaps a more likely explanation is that differences in the type of dilemma game
employed, and the number of plays, may encourage participants to employ different
strategies. For instance, Traulsen et al. (2009) identified a “common” but rarely researched
phenomenon, namely that individuals tend to “imitate more successful strategies but
sometimes also explore the available strategies at random” (p. 709). Helbing et al. (2005)
add that in this way, actors learn to acquire a strategy through the course of interactions.
Hence, they argue that seemingly random, exploratory strategies can appear to result in
increased cooperation. Accordingly, Ren,Wang &Qi (2007) point out that “the mechanism
of randomness promoting cooperations resembles a resonance like fashion, wherein
the randomness-induced prevalence of the ‘good’ strategy, i.e., cooperations, evokes the
positive effect of the . . . randomness on the system” (p. 2). The suggestion, then, is that par-
ticipants are initially more likely to explore different options, in order to subsequently settle
on what they believe is the most successful strategy for both themselves and the situation.
With this in mind, it is notable that within the Ketelaar & Au (2003) study participants
had already interacted for 40 rounds before the emotion manipulation tasks. This was
done so that SVO could be inferred from participants’ pattern of responses; however, it
may have also afforded them the opportunity to acquire strategic experience. Thus, when
they started to interact again they may have been less likely to explore their options using
a trial-and-error strategy — in turn, this may have served to amplify the small effect of
emotion manipulation by reducing the proportion of variation in responses attributable to
(trial and) error. In contrast, within the current game participants came straight from the
interventions to play the PDG for the first time. The game had been carefully explained to
them and their understanding had been checked through a series of questions, but they had
not actually played it. Further research might beneficially investigate individual differences
in trial-and-error strategies, rather than only attempting to counteract them.
Another explanation derives from Nelissen, Dijker & deVries (2007), who note in passing
that their use of a one-shot GSDG (as opposed to a repeated PDG) was designed to
eliminate trial-and-error responses (a similar methodology has been utilised by de Hooge
and colleagues, 2007; 2008). A further beneficial feature is that it lends itself to interval
level data (i.e., participant’s choose to give 0 to 10 coins) and thus the application of a more
powerful analysis. In the present study, only categorical data were available for each round
of the PDG (i.e., cooperate or defect). The logistic regression conducted on the first round
of data effectively treated the PDG as a “one shot”. However, the results were inconclusive,
and it is probably the case that a binary outcome is insufficiently sensitive to identify a small
effect of emotional manipulation.
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A final explanation for the divergence of current findings from those reported in
previous studies is the nature of the manipulation task. It has previously been shown
that the influence of induced emotions diminishes when individuals become aware that the
cause of their emotions is exogenous (that is, unrelated) to the task at hand (Higgins, 1996).
In their study using repeated PDG, Ketelaar & Au (2003) found exogenous guilt to have
an impact in only the first 10 of 40 rounds; however, in a second study, endogenous guilt
(i.e., guilt that participants experienced from not cooperating within the social dilemma
game itself) was found to increase cooperation one week later in a GSDG. Moreover,
de Hooge, Breugelmans & Zeelenberg (2008) found that endogenous and exogenous shame
possess different qualitative characteristics, so that endogenous shame seems to increase
cooperation whilst exogenous shame does not. Hertel et al. (2000) suggest that “whereas
trial and error strategies or deciding by chance might be an appropriate heuristic behaviour
when no useful cues are at hand, this situation should change when valid cues are available”
(p. 445). Thus, it could be argued that participants in the current study quickly realized
the exogenous nature of their emotions and therefore after the first round, engaged
in trial-and-error strategies before their SVO took over. Crucially, however, although
previous studies indicate the importance of excluding other strategies, we cannot be certain
that the first round was not the result of trial-and-error.
CONCLUSION
The present study provides further evidence for the importance of SVO as a determinant
of behaviour in cooperation. However, it did not support the findings of previous research
of a consistent impact of experienced guilt on cooperation over and above SVO, nor did it
show any impact of joy on cooperation.
More research is required in order to develop a full understanding of discrete emotions’
impact on cooperation. As well as giving systematic consideration to the impact of different
experimental methodologies (e.g., repeated PDG vs. one short GSDG), such research
should acknowledge the importance of distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous
emotions and perhaps compare their respective influences and interactions with existing
SVO.
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